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WEST YIRGINIA LAW QUA1TERLY

ments of the court, after being admonished not to converse about
the case. Fields v. Dewitt, 71 Kan. 676, 81 Pac. 467. Various
standards of a more requiring nature are applied in criminal
cases. It has been held, that the mere temporary separation of the
jury is not sufficient to constitute reversible error. People v. Douglass, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 26, 15 Am. Dec. 332; Jones v. State, 13 Tex.
168, 62 Am. Dec. 550. A few courts place the burden on the prisoner to show that he was prejudiced. Davis v. State, 3 Tex. App.
91; Gott v. People, 187 Ill. 249, 58 N. E. 293. The rule applied in
felony and capital cases by the United States Supreme Court and
fifteen states including West Virginia, is, that where there has been
an improper separation of the jury, and the verdict has been
against the prisoner, prejudice will be presumed and must be rebutted by the state or a new trial will be granted. Mattox v.
United States, 146 U. S. 140; State v. Robinson, 20 W.
Va. 713; State v. Clark, 51 W. Va. 457, 41 S. E. 204.
This presumption of prejudice may be rebutted by affidavit
of members of the jury. Commonwealth v. McCauley, 156
Mass. 49, 30 N. E. 76. In West Virginia, the testimony of the
jurors is receivable to disprove or explain the separation, but not
to show the motives by which they were actuated, or that the separation had no influence on the verdict. State v. Clark, supra. In
the principal case, the separation was explained to the satisfaction
of the court by the affidavit of the juror, and was correctly ruled
not to be prejudicial.
-R. J. R.

CRImmAL LAW-ISTOL TOTING.-Accused was arrested while
carrying in his hand a grip containing a 38 caliber pistol fully loaded with cartridges. Held, section 7 of Chapter 148 of the Code of
1913 forbidding any unlicensed person to carry about his person.
a pistol, etc., has been violated. State v. Blazovith, 107 S. E. 291,
(W. Va. 1921).
The decisions in other states upon similar facts under like or similar statutes are quite divergent, and show an irreconcilable conflict of opinion. A Virginia case held that the carriage of a pis-tol incased in a scabbard, in a pair of saddlebags, carried in the
hands of the accused was not a violation of a statute forbidding
the carrying of "concealed weapons about one's person," the court
saying that such statutes must be construed most favorably for the,
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accused and strictly against the state and that if such an interpretation was less comprehensive than the legislature intended, it was
for the legislature to change and not the court, since such would
be judicial legislation. Sutherland v. Commonwealth, 109 Va.
834, 65 S.E. 15. The test adopted by the Alabama court to determine whether a weapon is "about one's person" is whether the locomotion of the accused will carry the weapon with him, and accessability is immaterial. Ladd v. State, 92 Ala. 58, 9 So. 401.
Absurd conclusions have followed the application of this test to
actual cases. Thus, where the weapon was concealed under the
rug in the bottom of a buggy, or in saddlebags across a horse's back,
and therefore within easy and quick reach, the accused was aequitted because his locomotion would not carry the weapon with
him. In Ladd v. State, supra, a contrary e6nclusion was reached
where the weapon was concealed in a locked satchel strapped
across the shoulder of the accused. Warren v. State, 94 Ala. 79,
10 So. 838. The Tennessee court says, "It is the carrying with the
purpose of going armed that is the offense and what the legislature intended to prevent." Accordingly, the accused who carried a pistol under the seat of his wagon was held to have violated
the statute. Kendall v. State, 118 Tenn. 156, 101 S W. 189. In
Texas it has been held that a pistol is "about the person" when in
a basket on one's arm, when on the wagon seat, or under the buggy
cushion on which accused sat; when under the rug in bottom of
buggy in which defendant rode. Johnson v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R.
648, 10 S.W. 902; Garretv. State, 25 S.W. 285 (Tex.App.) ; Majfield v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 103, 70 S.W. 308; De Friend v. State,
69 Tex. Cr. R. 328, 153 S.W. 881. While a few decisions in this state
are apparently inconsistent with those just referred to, yet the
Texas court has definitely decided that the weight of authority is
in favor of a liberal interpretation, so as to effectuate the legislative purpose. Wagner v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. R. 66, 188 S.W. 1001.
The Texas court says that the word about must be held to mean,
within the pistol statute, "nearby, close at hand, convenient of access, and within such distance of the party so having it as that such
party could without materially changing his position, get his hand
upon it; otherwise every person having a vehicle would be authorized to keep prohibited weapons in his vehicle within reach of his
hand ready for action." Wagner v. State, supra.An early case under
such a statute and one much referred to by all the courts, held that
about one's person meant "in close proximity to him so that he
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could promptly use the weapon if prompted to do so." State v.
McManus, 89 N. C. 555. The Missouri court expresses the same
view by saying, "The Court owes a duty to the public to see that
the object of the statute is not frittered away by a narrow construction.' State v. Conley, 255 Mo. 185, 217 S. W. 29. Where
the possession of the weapon is only momentary, and for an innocent purpose, the statute has not been violated; but otherwise
where the purpose is unlawful. Sanderson v. State, 23 Tex. App.
220, 5 S. W. 138; Schup v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 165, 124 S. W. 928.
The West Virginia court in holding that the statute in question
is broad enough to include carriage in a satchel, grip or handbag,
indicates, inferentially at least, that it will carry this doctrine of
liberal construction further than the facts disclosed in the principal case, for it says, "Inhibition of such a carriage of deadly
weapons as makes resort to them easy and ready is clearly within
its purpose and spirit." Quaere, Is a deadly weapon carried in the
pocket of an automobile about one's person?
-M. H. K

STATUTE OF FRAUDS--PE1SONS

TO WHOM IT IS AVAILABLE

AS A

DEFENSE.-A and B, real estate partners, bought land, title to
which, for convenience, they took in the name of B. A, without
B's knowledge, contracted verbally to sell a portion of the land
to P. By the residuary clause of his will, B devised his title to his
wife C, and died. P seeks specific performance against A and C.
C demurred, setting up the Statute of Frauds. Held, C, not being
a party to the contract, can not set up the Statute of Frauds as a
defense. Tanner v. McCreary, 107 S. E. 405 (W. Va. 1921).
It is true that one not a party to a verbal contract for the sale of
land, or not in privity with the parties thereto, cannot interpose
the Statute of Frauds as a defense in a suit for specific performance of the contract. General Bonding etc. Co. v. Mcurdy, 183
S. W. 796 (Tex. Civ. 1916). See 1 BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS,
152; 20 Cyc. 306. But was not C a privy to this contract? Since
the property was paid for by both A and B, although the legal
title was conveyed to B, yet there was a resulting trust of the land
for the benefit of both A and B. Currence v. Ward, 43 W. Va.
368, 27 S. E. 329; Mankin v. Jones, 68 W. Va. 422, 69 S. D. 981.
A and B, then, held the equitable title as tenants in common. That
A had authority to contract for the partnership to sell the land in
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